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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC INSPECTORS
STEPHEN GOROVE*
T HE establishment of international controls over the peaceful uses of
atomic energy has become a cornerstone of post-war American and,
in general, Western foreign policy.' As a result of such policy, a number
of control systems have sprung into existence, such as the bilateral ar-
rangements' and the multilateral systems administered by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 3 the European Atomic Energy
* Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of Law,
University of Mississippi School of Law. This article is the outgrowth of a study and on the
spot survey sponsored by the American Society of International Law involving inter-
national procedures and techniques developed to control the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The author gratefully acknowledges the generous support and counsel of the Society and
its Advisory Group as well as the assistance received from officials of the United States
government and from officials of the international organizations concerned with the peaceful
uses of atomic energy. The text of the article expresses the views of the author.
1. The most comprehensive discussion of American foreign policy in the field of atomic
energy may be found in R. McKinney, Review of the International Atomic Policies and
Programs of the United States, Report to the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960). On more recent policy evaluation, see Report of the Advisory Comm. on
United States Policy Toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hearing Before the
Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1962). For an early appraisal
of American policy, see Knorr, American Foreign Policy and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, in Atoms for Power: United States Policy in Atomic Energy Development 100
(P. Jessup ed. 1957). Detailed discussion and assessment of U.S. initiative involving inter-
national cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy may be found in Gorove, Con-
trols Over Atoms-for-Peace: U.S. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 4 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 181 (1966).
2. For analyses of the bilateral arrangements, see Gorove, supra note 1; Gorove, Safe-
guarding Atoms-For-Peace: UX. Bilateral Agreements With Other Nations, 68 W. Va. L.
Rev. 263 (1966); Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-For-Peace Under Canadian Bilateral Agree-
ments With Other Nations, 42 Denver L. Center J. 41 (1965); Seaborg, Existing Arrange-
ments for International Control of Warlike Material-5: The United States Program of
Bilateral Safeguards, in 2 Disarmament & Arms Control 422 (1964).
The International Atomic Energy Agency [hereinafter cited as IAEA] is expected to
assume new responsibilities in the field of international atomic inspection and verification
following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
For a text of the treaty, see Annex, 59 Dep't State Bull. 9 (1968).
3. Informative accounts of the IAEA and its safeguards system are presented in Bech-
hoefer & Stein, Atoms For Peace: The New International Atomic Energy Agency, 55 Mich.
L. Rev. 747 (1957); Gorove, Maintaining Order Through On-Site Inspection: Focus on
the IAEA, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 1525 (1967); Gorove, Humanizing The Atom: Establishment
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 3 N.Y.L.F. 245 (1957); Hall, The Safeguards
Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in 2 Disarmament & Arms Control 170
(1964); Szass, The Law of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 3 Revue Beige
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Community (Euratom) ,4 and the European Nuclear Energy Agency
(ENEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) . All of these organizations provide elaborate machinery
to insure that designated materials, equipment and facilities will not be
diverted from peaceful to military purposes. The role of the inspectors
in the implementation of these systems is crucial. They must both verify
the uses to which the atom is put and make certain that no diversion goes
undetected. In order to insure their integrity and effectiveness, inspectors
are accorded certain privileges and immunities. The present article pre-
sents a detailed analysis of the rights of inspectors under the global
system of the IAEA and discusses such rights under the regional schemes
of Euratom and OECD's ENEA.
I. THE IAEA SYSTmM
The IAEA statute recognizes that the Agency must be able to enjoy,
in the territory of each member, such legal capacity and such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions, and
that the staff of the Agency must also be given such privileges and im-
munities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their official
functions.7 These rights have been defined in a separate Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA between the Agency and its
members.8 By terms of the Agreement, inspectors, as officials of the
de Droit International 196 (1967) ; Wllrich, Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 Am. J. Int'l
L. 34 (1966).
4. A thoroughgoing analysis and evaluation of the European Atomic Energy Community
[hereinafter cited as Euratom) control procedures may be found in Gorove, The First
Multinational Atomic Inspection and Control System at Work: Euratom's Experience, 18
Stan. L. Rev. 160 (1965). For brief appraisals, see Gorove, Inspection and Control in
Euratom, 23 Bull. Atomic Scientists, Mar., 1967, at 41; Gorove, Lessons from the Control
of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Euratom, 58 Proceedings of the Am. Soc'y
Int'l L. 136 (1964); Hahn, Control under the Euratom Compact, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 23,
27-32, 39-41 (1958).
S. For a comprehensive account and appraisal of the European Nuclear Energy Agency
[hereinafter cited as ENEA] security control machinery, see Gorove, The Inspection and
Control System of the European Nuclear Energy Agency, 7 Va. J. Int'l L, Apr,, 1967, at
68. For a brief, informative discussion, see Huet, the O.E.E.C. European Nuclear Engery
Agency, in 1 Law and Administration 180 (H. Marks ed. 1959); Vignes, Le Syst~me
De Contr6le De Securit6 De l'Agence Europfenne Pour l'Energie Nucl6aire, 7 Annualre
Franqais de Droit International 555 (1961).
6. On the problem of differentiating "peaceful" from "military" applications of nuclear
power, see Gorove, Distinguishing "Peaceful" from "Military" Uses of Atomic Energy: Some
Facts and Considerations, 30 Ohio St. L.J. 495 (1969).
7. Statute of the Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, art. XV (1956).
8. See Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/9/Rev. 1 (1959), 374 U.N.T.S. 148 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Agreement].
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Agency, enjoy both the regular privileges and immunities to which other
Agency officials are entitled as well as certain additional rights insofar
as necessary for the effective exercise of such activities. The usual rights
include: Immunity from legal process with respect to "words spoken or
written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity; ' the
same exemptions from taxation with respect to "the salaries and emol-
uments paid to them by the Agency" and on the same conditions as are
enjoyed by United Nations' officials; 10 immunity, together with their
spouses and relatives dependent on them, "from immigration restrictions
and alien registration;"" the same privileges with respect to "exchange
9. Id. at art. VI, § 18(a)(i). In commenting on an identical provision contained in the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, art. VI, § 19(a),
GA. Res. 179 (H), U.N. Doc. A/503 at 1307-10 (1947), (hereinafter cited as Specialized
Agencies Convention], Subcommittee I of the 6th Committee of the U.N. General Assembly
indicated that officials should pursue their official duties feeling confident that they are
protected from all personal liability in regard thereto before municipal tribunals (unless
immunity is waived). It was felt necessary that this immunity should continue after the
officials had ceased to be officials. United Nations, General Assembly, Sixth Comm, Final
Report of Subcomm. I, Coordination of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
and the Specialized Agencies, GA. Res. 179 (11), U.N. Doc. A./C.6/191 at 292 (1947) [here-
inafter cited as Final Report]. "The purpose of the immunity clearly requires that it would
always continue to be applicable in this manner, irrespective of whether or not it has been
thought necessary to take the precaution of including a specific provision on the sub-
ject .... " Further, it appears to be universally recognized that immunity from legal process
with respect to official acts is applicable irrespective of nationality. C. Jenks, International
Immunities 116 (1961).
10. Agreement at art. VI, § 18(a) (ii). Regarding an identical subsection in the Specialized
Agencies Convention, the Subcommittee said that the effect of such a provision is to make
whatever system is in force in respect of officials of the United Nations become automatically
applicable to officials of the specialized agency. The General Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, art. V, § 18(b) (1946) in [1946/1947] Y.B.U.N. 102,
provides that officials are to be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid
to them by the United Nations. Some countries, however, have a reservation to this
provision. The United States, for example, has declared that such an exemption was a
prerogative of the U.S. Congress alone. However, as Jenks points out, fundamental ideas
"underlying the principle of exemption, namely that equality in conditions of service
irrespective of nationality is essential to the morale and cohesiveness of an international
service and that no country should derive any national financial advantage from the presence
of international staffs the burden of which falls on its fellow members, continue to be fully
applicable." C. Jenks, supra note 9, at 123. It should also be noted that the Subcommittee
felt the immunity from taxation, like the immunity from legal process, should continue after
the officials had ceased to be officials. Final Report at 292.
11. Agreement at art. VI, § 18(a) (iii). Regarding an identical subsection in the Specialized
Agencies Convention, art. VI, § 19(c) the Subcommittee stated that the expression "exemp-
tion .. . from immigration restrictions" means freedom of entry. It is to be noted that
the expression is "immigration restrictions" not "immigration laws" and, therefore, relates
to all restrictions, whether they result from legislative or administrative action. Final Report
at 291.
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facilities as are accorded to officials of comparable rank of diplomatic
missions;"' 2 "the same repatriation facilities," together with their spouses
and relatives dependent on them, "in time of international crises as officials
of comparable rank of diplomatic missions; ' 13 "the right to import free
of duty their furniture and effects" upon arrival at their post; 14 the right
to be exempt under certain conditions from national service obligations;"0
the right "to use the United Nations' laissez-passer in conformity with
administrative arrangements concluded between the Director General of
the Agency and the Secretary-General of the United Nations."' 0
There are additional privileges and immunities enjoyed by inspectors
in their capacity as Agency officials while they exercise their functions
and travel in their official capacity en route to and from the performance
of these functions.1 7 These rights are also accorded to experts (other
than officials) serving on committees of the Agency or performing mis-
sions for the Agency including missions as inspectors. These rights are
granted as is necessary for the effective exercise of their functions, in-
12. Agreement at art. VI, § 18(a) (iv).
13. Id. at art. VI, § 18(a) (v). According to Jenks there are three essential points with
respect to such immunity: "[A]n unqualified immunity from detention as an enemy allen or
prisoner of war, the right to an appropriate standard of treatment pending repatriation,
and the right to depart freely and with dignity to an international headquarters, another
duty station or the home country when appropriate repatriation facilities can be arranged."
It is essential to these rights that they must apply fully to countries of transit as well as
to duty stations. C. Jenks, supra note 9, at 130.
14. Agreement at art. VI, § 18(a) (vi). Officials have the right to import their furniture
and effects free of duty at the time they assume their post. Commenting on an Identical
provision of Specialized Agencies Convention, the Subcommittee reported that a similar
exemption should be given if an official returns to the country in question after a long
absence because of official duties elsewhere. Consequently, if this point were not specifically
covered by § 18(a) (vi), governments should adopt a liberal interpretation of this provision.
Final Report at 293-94.
15. Agreement at art. VI, § 19. National service obligation exemptions are granted officials
of the Agency whose names have been compiled by the Director General of the Agency and
approved by their state of nationality. Should other officials of the Agency be called up for
national service, the state will, at the request of the Agency, grant temporary deferments
in order to prevent interruption of essential work. It is to be noted that the provision con-
cerning national service is conceived in very different terms from the absolute exemption
provided in the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art.
V, § 18(c) [1946/1947] Y.B.U.N. 102, to which several countries have made reservations.
Reporting on an identical provision in the Specialized Agencies Convention, art. VI, § 20,
the Subcommittee noted that this immunity creates no legal obligation to exempt any given
official from national service obligations, but it does provide for consulation between the
Agency and any government to prevent disruption of Agency operation because of national
service requirements. The Norwegian delegate stressed the necessity for the exemption of at
least higher officials to insure independence from their government. See Final Report at 294.
16. Agreement at art. IX, § 28.
17. Id. at art. VI, § 18(b).
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cluding the time spent on journeys in connection with service on such
committees or missions." The additional privileges and immunities in-
clude: "Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of
their personal baggage;" immunity from legal process of every kind with
respect "to words spoken or written or acts done by them in the perfor-
mance of their official functions, such immunity to continue notwith-
standing that the persons concerned are no longer serving on committees
of, or employed on missions for, the Agency;" "[i]nviolability for all
papers and documents;" for the purpose "of their communications with
the Agency, the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence
by courier or in sealed bags;" the same facilities with respect to "cur-
rency and exchange restrictions as are accorded to representatives of
foreign [g] overnments on temporary official missions;" the same immuni-
ties and facilities with respect to "their personal baggage as are accorded
to members of comparable rank of diplomatic missions."'"
To avoid any misunderstanding as to who is entitled to immunity, the
Agency periodically makes known to the governments of all states which
are parties to the Agreement the names of the officials to whom these
immunities apply.20 The Agreement itself provides that the term "of-
ficials of the Agency" means the Director General and all members of
the Agency staff, except those who are locally recruited and assigned to
hourly rates.21
The Agency's so-called "Inspector's Document"2 requires inclusion
18. Id. at art. VII, § 23.
19. Id.
20. Id. at art. VI, § 17.
21. Id. at art. I, § 1(v). It should be noted that a United States decision, in discusing the
problem of extending immunity to a personal chauffeur of the Secretary-General, held that
the United Nations Charter should be interpreted "as being limited in the application of the
principle of immunity to those personnel whose activities are such as to be necessary to the
actual execution of the purposes and deliberations of the United Nations as distinguished from
those household servants and personnel who merely serve the personal comfort, convenience
or luxury of the delegates and Secretariat who actually perform the true functions of the
organization." Westchester County v. Ranollo, 187 Alisc. 777, 781, 67 N.Y.S2d 31, 35 (New
Rochelle City Ct. 1946).
22. IAEA Doc. GCV/INF/39, Annex, at 3 (1962). Provisions referring to the application
of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA have been included, for instance,
in the Agency Agreements with the Congo, IAEA Doc. IN/FCIRC/37, art. VII, § 8 (1963);
Pakistan, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/34, art. VII, § 9 (1962); Norway, LAEA Doc. INFCIRC/29,
art. X, § 22 (1961); and Yugoslavia, IAEA Doc. IiN2FCIRC/32, Annex A, para. C.10 (1961).
See IAEA Docs. -NFCIRC/37 (1963); INFCIRC/34 (1962); INIFCIRC/29 (1961);
INFCIRC/32 (1961).
Art. III, §§ 16, 17 of the tripartite Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy
Agency, The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America
for the Application of Safeguards by the Agency to the Bilateral Agreement Between thome
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of suitable provisions in each project or safeguards agreement for the
application, insofar as relevant to the execution of that agreement, of
the pertinent stipulations of the Agreement on the Privileges and Im-
munities of the IAEA. This is, of course, provided that all parties to the
project or safeguards agreement so agree. In the course of the discussions
before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Agency's Inspectors, the Soviet
Union favored such inclusion only if the state concerned was a party to
the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities. Under such limitations,
Agency inspectors would have enjoyed no privileges and immunities in
any IAEA member state that had not yet accepted the Agreement. In
effect, therefore, it would not have been possible to conduct any inspec-
tions in such states.2 3 The provision incorporated in the "Inspector's
Document" in its present form is designed to apply principally to states
that have not yet accepted the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities,
for those that have done so would already be bound by virtue of its
provisions applicable to inspectors.
Privileges and immunities are granted to officials and experts "in the
interest of the Agency only and not for the personal benefit of the indi-
viduals themselves." The Agency has the right and duty "to waive the im-
munity of any expert in any case where, in its opinion, the immunity
would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice"
to its interests. If the immunity is waived, the official may be sued or
prosecuted in local courts.24
In using its discretion regarding the waiver of immunity, the Agency is
required to cooperate "at all times with the appropriate authorities of
Member States to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure
Governments Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Sept. 23, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T.
1265, T.I.AS. No. 5429, 488 U.N.T.S. 99 stipulates that Japan shall apply the provisions of
the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
whereas the provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 288-288(g) (1964), shall apply to Agency inspectors performing functions in the United
States. It should be noted that the Soviet Union found the application of American legislation
objectionable on the ground that the Agency's inspectors would not enjoy the privileges and
immunities set forth in the Inspector's Document, but would be subject instead to an internal
United States law, the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945. Cf. art. III,
§ 15 of the Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Govern-
ment of the United States for the Application of Safeguards to United States Reactor
Facilities, June 15, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1456, T.I.A.S. No. 5621; art III, § 10 of the Agreement
Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the United States
of America for the Application of Agency Safeguards to Four United States Reactor Facilities,
Mar. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 415, T.I.A.S. No. 5002.
23. The Soviet Union also favored the inclusion of a provision in every project or safe-
guard agreement to the effect that the privileges and immunities of inspectors would not
exceed those granted to diplomats. IAEA Doc. GC (IV) COM. 2/OR 19, at 10 (1960).
24. Agreement at art. VI §§ 21, 22, art. VII, § 25.
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the observance of police regulations and prevent the occurrence of any
abuses in [connection] with the privileges, immunities and facilities"
made available under the Agreement.2
Should there be any disputes arising out of the interpretation or ap-
plication of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities by the
Agency, they must be referred to the International Court of Justice,
unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement. Absent such an
agreement, if a difference arises between the Agency and a member, the
International Court is requested to give an advisory opinion on any legal
question involved. This opinion is final.20
Regarding disputes involving an Agency official or expert (inspector)
who enjoys immunity by reason of his official position, the organization
is required to make a provision for an appropriate mode of settlement if
immunity has not been waived.27 This should not occur too frequently
since the Agency is required to waive immunity in any case where, in its
opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be
waived without prejudice to the Agency's interests. Furthermore, officials
have immunity only with respect to their official acts, and even in such
cases immunity is normally waived with regard to matters of a private
law character if such waiver is possible without prejudicing the interests
of the organization.'
Should any state which is a party to the Agreement on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Agency consider that there has been an abuse of a
privilege or immunity, consultations are to be held between that state
and the Agency to determine whether any such abuse has, in fact, oc-
curred and, if so, to attempt to insure against repetition. If such consul-
tations fail to achieve a result satisfactory to the state and the Agency,
the question whether an abuse has occurred is to be determined by the
same procedure required for the settlement of differences arising out of
the interpretation of the application of the Agreement on the Privileges
and Immunities of the IAEA. If it is found that such an abuse has
occurred, the state affected by the abuse has the right, after notification
to the Agency, to withhold from the Agency the benefits of the privileges
or immunities so abused. However, the withholding of privileges or im-
munities must not interfere with the Agency's principal activities or
prevent the Agency from performing its main functions. -9
The Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA also
25. Id. at art. VI, § 22.
26. Id. at art. X, § 34.
27. Id. at § 33(b).
28. Id. at art. VI, § 21; art. VII, § 25; cf. Final Report at 295.
29. Agreement at art. VIII, § 26.
19701
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
provides that no official of the Agency is to be required by the territorial
authorities to leave the country in which he is performing any of his
official duties. In the case of an abuse caused by activities outside his
official function, however, he may be required to leave by the government
of that country. If such a person, on the other hand, is entitled to the
immunities of the Director General of the Agency as provided by the
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities, he is not to be required to
leave the state except in accordance with the procedure applicable to
diplomatic envoys accredited to that country. In the case of other officials
not entitled to the immunities of the Director General, no order to leave
the country may be issued by territorial authorities unless the foreign
minister of the country has approved, and such approval is to be given
only after consultation with the Director General of the Agency. If
expulsion proceedings are taken against an official, the Director General
of the Agency has the right to appear in these proceedings on behalf of
the official.30
If different provisions are included in the specific project or safeguards
agreement, the disputes between the state and the Agency arising out of
abuse of privilege by the Agency inspectors would have to be settled in
accordance with such stipulations."'
If his immunity is waived, an Agency official (inspector) may be sued
in national courts for damages to the injured party, including the Agency,
and may also be prosecuted. In case the Agency decides not to waive the
official's immunity, it is required to provide for other appropriate modes
of settlement, such as arbitration. 2
II. EURATOM AND OECD's ENEA
The privileges and immunities granted to Euratom inspectors are
governed by the Euratom Treaty Protocol on the Privileges and Immu-
30. Id. at art. VI, § 20; art. VII, § 27.
31. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Agency's Inspectors was unable to reach agreement
on the inclusion into the Inspector's Document of a provision to cover the situation where
an inspector was alleged to have abused his privileges and immunities. Some representatives
considered that such a situation should be dealt with under the provisions of the Agreement
on Privileges and Immunities of the Agency as eventually incorporated in the relevant
project or safeguard features of the agreement. The Soviet representative, however, proposed
inclusion of a provision stating the unconditional right of the receiving states to require any
inspector acting outside the limits of his prescribed functions or abusing his privileges and
immunities to leave the country. India supported the Soviet position on the ground that If a
state refused to cooperate with an inspector the inspector could not do his work and would
have no alternative but to leave. The Soviet proposal, however, failed to receive suffident
support in view of strong opposition from the Western powers and their allies. IAEA Doc.
GC(IV)/COM. 2/OR. 19, at 10 (1960).
32. Cf. text accompanying note 26 supra.
[Vol. 38
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nities of the Community.33 The inspectors, as Community officials, are
given immunity from legal process for acts performed by them in their
official capacity, including their words spoken or written. They are ac-
corded this immunity in the territory of each member state, irrespective
of their nationality. Moreover, they continue to benefit from such im-
munity after their functions have ceased.' It should be pointed out,
however, that despite such immunity, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities is competent to decide any case between Euratom and
its employees, within the limits and under the conditions laid down by
relevant statute of service or conditions of employment. Personal liabil-
ity of employees toward the Community is to be determined in accordance
with the provisions establishing the statute of service or the relevant
conditions of employment. 35
Community inspectors, their spouses and the members of their families
dependent on them are not subject to immigration restrictions or to
formalities for the registration of foreign persons. With respect to cur-
rency or exchange regulations they are to be accorded the same facilities
as are granted by custom to the officials of international organizations. 0
Inspectors, like other officials, have the right to import, free of duty,
any furniture and effects they possess when they first take up their post
in the country concerned. Upon the termination of their functions they
have the right to export, free of duty, such furniture and effects subject,
in both cases, to the conditions laid down by the country in which this
right is exercised. This right also extends to automobiles purchased for
personal use in the country of their last residence or nationality."
Community officials are liable to the Community for a tax on the
salaries and wages paid to them by the Community. They are, however,
exempt from national income taxes.3" With respect to income tax, capital
tax, death duties, and the application of conventions on the avoidance of
double taxation agreements between member states of the Community,
the officials and other employees of the Community who, solely by reason
of the exercise of their functions in the service of the Community, estab-
33. For tests of the Euratom Treaty and its protocol on the Privileges and Immunities
of the Community, see Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM), Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter cited as Treaty]. A substantial
portion of the treaty is reproduced in 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 955 (1957). Protocol on the Priv-
ileges and Immunities of the European Atomic Energy Community, Jan. 1, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. 250 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
34. Protocol at art. 11(a).
35. Treaty at arts. 152, 188.
36. Protocol at art. 11(a)-(c).
37. Id. at art. 11(d), (e).
38. Id. at art. 12.
1970]
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lish their residence in the territory of a member state other than the
country where they have their residence for tax purposes at the time of
their entry into the service of the Community, are to be considered both
in the country of their actual residence and in the country of residence
for tax purposes as having maintained their residence in the latter country
rather than the former, provided that it is a member of the Community.
This provision is also applicable to a spouse, to the extent that the spouse
is not exercising his or her own professional activities, and to children
dependent on and in the care of the persons referred to in this article. 0
Movable property belonging to persons referred to in the preceding
paragraph and situated in the territory of the country of actual residence
is exempt from death duties in that country. For the assessment of such
duty, such property is to be considered as being in the country of res-
idence for tax purposes, subject to the rights of third countries and to
the possible application of provisions of international conventions on
double taxation.
Any residence acquired solely by reason of the exercise of functions in
the service of other international organizations is not to be taken into
consideration in applying the provisions of this article.4"
The officials4 ' (including inspectors) of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), now known as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), are entitled to a
number of privileges and immunities. Thus, for instance, they enjoy im-
munity from legal process with respect to things done by them in their
official capacity. They continue to enjoy such immunity after completion
of their functions as officials of the organization. They also enjoy the
same exemption from taxation with respect to the salary and emolu-
ments paid to them as is enjoyed by officials of the principal international
organizations and on the same conditions. In addition, they are immune,
together with their spouses and dependent relatives, from immigration
restrictions and alien registration and are accorded the same privileges
relating to exchange facilities as are accorded to officials of comparable
rank forming part of diplomatic missions. They are given, together with
their spouses and dependent relatives, the same repatriation facilities in
39. Id. at art. 13.
40. Id.
41. The Secretary-General of the Organization specifies the categories of officials who are
entitled to privileges and immunities. He submits a list of these categories to the Council of
the Organization and communicates it to all members of the organization. "The names of
the officials included in these categories [are] from time to time made known to [remmbers"
of the organization. See Supplementary Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for European Eco-
nomic Co-operation on the Legal Capacity, Privileges and Immunities of the Organization,
art. 13 (1948). For text of this Protocol see 43 Am. J. Int'l L. 102 (Supp. 1949).
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time of international crisis as members of diplomatic missions. Also,
they have the right to import duty free their furniture and effects when
they assume their post.'
As in the case of IAEA and Euratom officials, the "privileges, immu-
nities and facilities are granted to [ENEA] officials in the interests of
the Organization and not for the personal benefit of the individuals con-
cerned." The Secretary-General of the OECD has "the right and the duty
to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, theimmunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without
prejudice to the interests" of the organization.4 3
The OECD is required to cooperate at all times with the appropriate
authorities of member states "to facilitate the proper administration of
justice, secure the observance of police regulations and prevent the
occurrence of any abuse in [connection] with the privileges, immunities,
exemptions and facilities" accorded to its officials.4
IlI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The foregoing survey of the privileges and immunities of international
atomic inspectors reveals an elaborate network of safeguards designed
to insure that the vital functions associated with international atomic
inspection and verification can be carried out smoothly and without fear
of interference or reprisals on the part of the inspected state. Such fear,
if real, may constitute a serious psychological impediment and may ad-
versely affect the general climate in which the inspection takes place.
The provision according immunity from legal process with regard to
words spoken or written or acts performed in an official capacity consti-
tutes an important safeguard designed to assure the unfettered exercise
of inspectorial functions. An additional guarantee that such immunity
will not become illusory is the assurance that the immunity will continue
even after the inspector's functions have ceased. At the same time, the
provision which enables the international agency to waive the inspector'simmunity in case of his abuse of the privilege makes it abundantly clear
that the privileges and immunities are granted in the interest of the inter-
national agency and not for the individual benefit of the inspector. The
provision regarding waiver of an immunity is an essential counterpart to
the immunity from legal process. Its aim is to insure that the inspectors
will not act capriciously or contrary to their given assignments or direc-
tives.
In the balance, the immunities and privileges accorded to international
42. Id. at art. 14.
43. Id. at art. 16.
44. Id. at art. 17.
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atomic inspectors have worked well, protecting-on the one hand-the
integrity of the inspection staff from abuse and interference by the in-
spected state and reducing-on the other hand-the chances of any
wanton exercise of inspectorial power. No reports of any significant prob-
lems have been encountered and if there have been minor misunderstand-
ings, they have most likely been settled under the cloak of routine
diplomacy.
The future of international (IAEA) atomic inspection appears brighter
today than at any previous time during its relatively brief history. The
eventual policing of the recently concluded Non-Proliferation Treaty by
IAEA inspectors in order to reduce the chances of the further spread
of nuclear weapons will constitute a significant milestone in the develop-
ment and practice of international atomic inspection procedures. The
enhanced role of international atomic inspection may also provide an
invaluable testing ground for the techniques and experiences necessary
to police any future partial or general disarmament agreements.
